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EXECUTIVE DETENTION IN TIME OF WAR
Richard A. Posner*
IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS: DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL IN
WARTIME BRITAIN. By A. W. Brian Simpson. Oxford: Clarendon
Press. 1992. Pp. x, 453. $62.
During World War II, Great Britain, like the United States
and, I imagine, every other belligerent nation and doubtless many neu-
tral ones as well - imprisoned a number of its own citizens (not to
mention aliens) without lodging criminal charges against them. Brian
Simpson, the versatile, distinguished, and prolific English legal histo-
rian and jurisprudent now teaching at the University of Michigan Law
School, tells the story of Britain's use of executive detention during
World War II with his accustomed combination of wit, panache, an
eye for the vivid and telling detail, narrative vigor and clarity, and
tenacious burrowing in archives and survivors' (or their descendants')
memories.1
The legal vehicle for the program of detention was a regulation,
denoted Regulation 18B, promulgated by the Cabinet pursuant to an
emergency defense bill passed by Parliament a week before Germany
invaded Poland in 1939. The regulation had been drafted much ear-
lier, however; it was in fact an updated version of a regulation that had
authorized executive detention in World War I and in troubled peri-
ods in Ireland. As amended shortly after the outbreak of World War
II, Regulation 18B authorized the Home Office, which corresponds
roughly to our Department of Justice, to detain any person upon "rea-
sonable cause to believe" that he was "of hostile origin or associations
or to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public
safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation
of such acts."' 2 The person detained was entitled to make "objections"
to an advisory committee appointed by the Home Office, and the
chairman of the committee was required "to inform the objector of the
grounds on which the order [of detention, or other restriction] ha[d]
been made and to furnish him with such particulars as [were] in the
opinion of the chairman sufficient to enable him to present his case"
* Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Senior Lecturer in Law,
University of Chicago. A.B. 1959, Yale; LL.B. 1962, Harvard. - Ed.
1. Simpson understands that historians have a duty to report fascinating discoveries even
when not strictly relevant to their study, so I was pleased to learn that the British Home Office
"has a history of curious gifts, the oddest perhaps being a dead baby, posted to the Home Secre-
tary by an eccentric parson back in 1884, and marked 'perishable."' P. 391.
2. P. 424. The entire regulation is reprinted at pp. 424-25.
1675
Michigan Law Review
(p. 425). After hearing the objector's case, the advisory committee
would advise the Home Secretary whether to continue or lift the de-
tention order. The regulation contains no reference to judicial review.
A total of 1847 detention orders were executed under Regulation
18B, of which 1145 were against "straightforwardly British citizens"
(p. 223) as distinct from aliens, persons who had been born in nations
with which Britain was at war, or persons of uncertain nationality.
The vast majority of the orders were issued in May, June, and July of
1940, the nadir of Britain's fortunes in the war; the peak month was
June, when 826 orders were issued, although not all were executed.
The names of persons to be detained were supplied to the Home Office
by the Security Service, commonly known as MI5. 3 The Home Secre-
tary reviewed the Security Service's recommendation, though often
perfunctorily, and if the recommendation was approved, the person to
be detained was immediately arrested, without any warning, and im-
prisoned. If the detained person filed an objection, he was given a
hearing before an advisory committee, though often not for several
months. He could be advised by a lawyer, but the lawyer was not
permitted to attend the hearing. The advisory committees were com-
posed of distinguished private citizens; the chairmen were lawyers.
Often, as a result of the hearing, the committee would recommend to
the Home Office that the detained person be released, and these rec-
ommendations, though often opposed by the Security Service, were
generally followed. Most detainees were released after some months;
very few were held to the end of the war. Some challenged their de-
tention in court, mainly by habeas corpus proceedings. These chal-
lenges were uniformly unsuccessful.
The largest group of citizen detainees were members or ex-mem-
bers of the British Union of Fascists (BU), headed by Sir Oswald Mos-
ley (he and his wife were among the detainees), or of other pro-Nazi or
fascist associations. Among the persons detained were a Member of
Parliament, a retired admiral, and a peer. The Security Service be-
lieved that the people it wanted detained represented a potential Fifth
Column that would erode the British will to fight and, in the event of a
German invasion, assist the German army. In retrospect it is apparent
that the Security Service greatly exaggerated the danger of Fifth Col-
umn activity in Britain. The potential Fifth Columnists were few, and
the vast majority of them were harmless cranks given to anti-Semitism
and "nostalgic veteranism" (p. 116); one of the BU's front organiza-
tions was the London and Provincial Anti-Vivisection Society, and af-
ter his release one of the detainees composed an autobiography that he
entitled Out of Step: Events in the Two Lives of an Anti-Jewish Camel
Doctor. Even the leaders and hard-core members of the BU were, with
3. M15 stands for "Military Intelligence 5"; the Security Service began life as a branch of
military intelligence.
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only a few exceptions, loyal to their country, though prone to admire
Germany and to criticize Britain for having entered the war on the
side of France and Poland. "That there was never any real need to
lock most detainees up is simply common sense" (p. 411). The Secur-
ity Service's mistake was soon evident, even to itself, and the contin-
ued if diminishing use of Regulation 18B after the summer of 1940
was largely a sop to the British Labour Party, which was fiercely hos-
tile to the BU. Churchill was an early skeptic about the existence of a
Fifth Column in Britain, and it was he who later in the war described
executive detention as "in the highest degree odious" and "the founda-
tion of all totalitarian government whether Nazi or Communist" (p.
391).
The number of detentions, in a nation of forty-seven million people
engaged in a desperate struggle for survival, was small, the detentions
mostly brief, and the exaggeration of the Fifth Column danger under-
standable, for it was an article of faith at the time that the collapse of
most of Germany's enemies like ninepins had been due to the "enemy
within." Indeed the Germans themselves attributed their sudden col-
lapse in the fall of 1918 to such machinations, and the term Fifth Col-
umn had originated in the Spanish Civil War, when Franco credited it
as a factor in his victory. Better to be safe than sorry, the British
authorities - security, executive, and judicial - must have believed.
In incomparably more dangerous circumstances than those facing the
United States after Pearl Harbor, the British responded to the danger
of the "enemy within" with greater restraint than our government did
when it decided to incarcerate tens of thousands of U.S. citizens of
Japanese origin living on the West Coast.
Simpson was a child during World War II, but an old enough one
to retain in adulthood vivid memories of the war. So it is a tribute to
his detachment that he is so critical of Britain's program of wartime
detention. And critical he is. He concentrates on three institutions
involved in the program: the Security Service, the Home Office, and
the courts. The key to his assessment of the Security Service lies in his
statement that "intelligence organizations attract peculiar and unrelia-
ble people,"4 at least in time of peace. The Security Service had been a
backwater between the world wars and thus was not adequately staffed
at the outset of the second war to perform the duties heaped on it,
including the enforcement of Regulation 18B. "Its archive must have
largely comprised ill-digested and unreliable tittle-tattle," and "it con-
centrated on deviant groups, such as the Nordic League or Right
Club, which possessed about as much significance in the life of the
nation as the Flat Earth Society" (p. 417). Because "[s]ecurity, not
4. P. 92. An example was Harold Kurtz, later "employed to record the dying words of the
Nazi war criminals incompetently hanged by the American executioner, an assignment which
did not improve his drink habit." P. 368.
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justice, is the business of security services" (p. 93), the Security Service
showed scant regard for civil liberties. It was "engaged in the pursuit
of phantoms" (p. 92); but then "those who believe in the enemy in our
midst," as the Security Service was naturally disposed to do, "have
minds insulated against evidence; its absence proves the extreme skill
of the enemy" (p. 108). "You can never really trust security services,
for they are in the business of constructing threats to security, and the
weaker the evidence the more sinister the threat is thought to be. And
the mechanisms which insulate them from public accountability con-
tribute to their unreliability" (pp. 410-11).
The Home Office comes off better in Simpson's account. (The Se-
curity Service was not part of the Home Office; apparently it reported
directly to the Cabinet.) "In general Home Office officials seem to
have genuinely respected legality, though there was a willingness to
stretch things and break the rules when it seemed in the public interest
to do so" (p. 415). Simpson's major criticism is that the civil servants
of the Home Office were implacably hostile to open government and
judicial review. But he is also critical of the sudden arrests, which
were made by officers of the Special Branch of Scotland Yard, a part of
the Home Office, and of the conditions in the prisons (also run by the
Home Office) in which the detainees were held. "An arrest was...
rather like a heart attack, or indeed a visit from the Gestapo, in its
immediate social consequences" (p. 87). No provision was made for
informing relatives that a person had been detained or where he was
being taken; and although detained persons, not being charged with or
convicted of any crime, were supposed to be treated with considera-
tion, in fact they were treated much like ordinary prison inmates, at
least in the period of mass detentions. Mothers were sometimes sepa-
rated from young children, and the medical needs of detainees were
not always properly attended to. Some of the detainees were off their
rockers. James Larratt Battersby, "known in fascist circles as 'the
mad hatter'" (p. 250) - he was in the hat business - was detained
for three years and after his release established a religious center for
the worship of Hitler as the risen Christ. He committed suicide in
1955. "Cause and effect are hard in these areas to prove, but detention
does not seem to have been good for Battersby" (p. 251). Simpson
attributes "the apparent inhumanity" of the detentions to the callous-
ness of Home Office officials: "A great deal of what the Home Office
did, or still does, is intrinsically very unpleasant .... A certain detach-
ment is needed to preside over such things .... Civil Servants deal
with files, not people" (p. 415). Simpson acknowledges, however, that
"many in the armed services in Britain in 1940 must have endured
conditions quite as bad as those of the detainees" (p. 246).
As for the legal profession, it shows very badly in Simpson's
account:
[T]he courts did virtually nothing for the detainees, either to secure their
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liberty, to preserve what rights they did possess under the regulation, to
scrutinize the legality of Home Office action, or to provide compensation
when matters went wrong. The legal profession too, as a profession, did
nothing; I am told that it was not easy to persuade lawyers to act for
detainees at all. [pp. 418-19]
The basic position of the courts was that, so long as the Home Office
acted on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the detainee fell under
one of the criteria of the regulation, his detention was legal. Because
the courts did not require the Home Office to submit to them the evi-
dence on which its suspicion was based - the evidence consisted
mainly of files of the Security Service, and the government might have
asserted "Crown privilege" had the courts demanded them - judges
were helpless to give meaningful review to the detention orders. They
intoned "the traditional judicial humbug on the liberty of the subject"
(p. 364) but were content to accept "the Home Office affidavit [that
reasonable grounds for the order existed] as conclusive so long as no
formal irregularities appeared" (p. 328). "Civil Servants were nervous
of strong-minded judges" (p. 311) but had little to fear. One judge did
dissent from the dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus, saying that
"judges should [not] be 'mice squeaking under a chair in the Home
Office'" (p. 328), but he deleted this phrase from his published opin-
ion, and "his concern was not so much with civil liberty as with judi-
cial status" (p. 329). "The only circumstance capable of galvanizing
the judges into action was blatant lack of respect for their status ....
The judges were prepared to behave like mice, so long as they were
treated like lions" (p. 331). "As for the traditional judicial practice of
trumpeting professional solicitude for the liberty of the subject, the
less said the better" (p. 419).
I have no basis for quarreling with Simpson's criticisms in detail,
but I think his overall verdict on the wartime detention program is too
severe. That severity is evident from the passages I have quoted but
even more so from the summary assessments sprinkled throughout the
book. Simpson says that the function of law in the scheme that be-
came Regulation 18B was to be "the instrument with which the rule of
law was to be abolished, to be replaced by executive discretion, exer-
cised by gentlemen, in secret, in pursuance of the public interest" (p.
44). "[T]he legal regime under which Britain fought the war was that
of a totalitarian state" (p. 46). "Britain had, within a very few weeks,
become, in the name of liberty, a totalitarian state" (p. 190).
"[D]uring the war Britain was not, in any real sense, a democratic
state" (p. 282). The ultimate question these passages raise is whether
it is essential to the survival of liberal democracies "that they should
temporarily cease to be liberal democracies until the threat is over" (p.
409).
The severity of Simpson's assessment has many causes. One is his
uncritical use of the terms democracy and totalitarian. He implicitly
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divides the possible forms of government into just two, democratic and
totalitarian; anything that is not one is the other, and in particular,
anything that does not conform to a specific conception of democratic
government is totalitarian. This classification is objectionable on three
counts.
First, it conceals important distinctions. The fact that for a short
period during the war Britain in effect suspended habeas corpus, as
Lincoln had done early in our Civil War, is not equivalent to the
wholesale extinction of liberty, legality, and democracy by Nazi Ger-
many and the Soviet Union in war and peace alike. We should not
forget that the British electorate threw out Churchill and the Con-
servative Party before the war ended, a denouement unthinkable in a
totalitarian state. The United States did not cease to be a democracy
in 1942, even though it interned tens of thousands of its citizens on
flimsy grounds.
Second, Simpson imposes on the term democracy an arbitrary and
even somewhat paradoxical meaning - democracy ceases to be such if
executive detention is permitted - though in fact there is tension be-
tween legality and democracy. Simpson acknowledges that there was
no popular pressure to abrogate Regulation 18B even when the felt
necessity for it had passed. Fascists and fascist sympathizers were,
unsurprisingly, intensely unpopular; the British people were happy to
see them detained. The popular will was fulfilled rather than thwarted
by this "undemocratic" regulation. No doubt even popular measures
for the repression of the politically unpopular can undermine democ-
racy. Plebiscitary democracy, even Athenian democracy, which was
notably lacking in legal protection of rights, is not the best, perhaps
not even the most democratic, form of democracy. But it is rather a
stretch to call a regime totalitarian merely because it does not place
legal checks on democratic preference.
Third, it is untrue that democratic or liberal institutions must be
invariant to circumstances. That idea was refuted by Justice Robert
Jackson when he remarked that the Constitution is not a suicide pact.5
Liberal democracy is a means, not an end, and one of the ends to
which it is a means is national survival in the face of a totalitarian
nation bent on conquest. It is no more "totalitarian" for a liberal de-
mocracy to suspend some civil liberties in wartime than it is for a lib-
eral democracy to have an army in which officers are appointed rather
than elected.
Another source of Simpson's negative assessment of Britain's war-
time detentions is his unwillingness, as it seems to me, to accept people
and institutions for what they are. It is a fact, and a readily under-
standable one, that an intelligence service attracts peculiar and unreli-
5. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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able people in peacetime and may thus be inadequately prepared for
the strains of war. It is readily understandable that civil servants re-
sent political and judicial interference with their work, that police and
prison work attracts people less delicate than professors, and that the
work itself makes them more callous. As Hamlet put it, "the hand of
little employment hath the daintier sense."' 6 It is also a fact that
judges care about their status and are reluctant to check the executive
in matters of national security. Our vaunted independent judiciary
upheld the Japanese relocation, upheld the constitutionality of the
Smith Act until the wind had gone out of the Act's sails, and has
devised ingenious doctrines for minimizing judicial intervention in
military and foreign policy. People being what they are, with their
human failings and professional deformations, it is not to be expected
that the administration of a program of executive detention in wartime
will be a model of efficiency and rectitude. The question is whether
the program, given the inevitable abuses, is on balance worthwhile. If
it is, the abuses are worth pointing out, but they do not condemn the
program.
The absence of a comparative dimension is a closely related source
of Simpson's disparagement of his country's response to national
emergency. Peacetime civil liberties are a luxury that nations engaged
in wars of survival do not believe they can afford. The question for the
realistic civil libertarian is not whether Britain curtailed civil liberties
more than either seemed at the time or was in retrospect necessary,
but whether it reacted more or less temperately than other nations in
comparable circumstances would do or have done. So far as I can
judge, the answer to this question is more temperately7 - than the
United States, for example, which was far less endangered.8 Of course
there are perils in using a purely relative standard. The administration
of Regulation 18B caused hardships and, in hindsight at least, seems
not to have contributed materially to Britain's survival or to have
shortened the war. If there are lessons here that might enable Britain
or the United States to deal more effectively with the problem of inter-
nal security in wartime the next time the problem arises, they ought to
be drawn. But the only lesson Simpson draws is that Britain should
not have destroyed "about 99 per cent of public records dealing with
detention, which is in line with general practice" (p. 422) and should
not be refusing access, half a century later, to most of the rest. I am
sure this observation is right, but it makes for rather a tepid ending to
the book; the ending reads as if the British government's greatest sin
6. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 5, sc. 1.
7. Simpson does remark this (p. 413), but he quickly drops the point.
8. J. Gregory Sidak discusses the Japanese relocation and other wartime suspensions of civil




with respect to the wartime detention program was to make it difficult
for academics to write the program's history.
I am not sure how many of these points Simpson would reject if
they were pointed out to him, because his book displays considerable
ambivalence about the ultimate merit of Regulation 18B. He notes
official fears before World War II "that the horrors of the trenches
had produced a state of affairs, symbolized by the celebrated King and
Country motion in the Oxford Union in 1933, in which it might be
extremely difficult for the government to conduct war at all" (p. 46).
He acknowledges "the widespread [although, again, erroneous] belief
that Norway's collapse was brought about by 'Quislings'" (pp. 98-99)
and appears to agree that the British Union of Fascists "was pro-Ger-
man and undermined morale, and might get up to mischief" (p. 167).
In fact, "a British Fifth Column, that is a number of individuals who
were, with some element of organization, clandestinely assisting the
enemy, actually existed" (p. 171). While regarding "[tihe acceptance
by the [House of] Commons of the detention of one of its own mem-
bers in conditions of complete secrecy" as "quite bizarre in a liberal
democracy," he acknowledges that "the times were desperate" (p.
282). He notes that "common sense would also suggest that deten-
tions under 18B may have in some instances prevented individuals
with pro-German sympathies from attempted acts of espionage or sab-
otage and been useful in contributing to the control of the IRA or in
preventing leakage of information about the Normandy landings" (p.
412). The judges "may have been right in conceiving of the conflict
[between them and the Home Office] in terms of status: not so much
their personal status, but that of the institution to which they be-
longed" (p. 422). Regulation 18B may even "have saved some individ-
uals from violence, from long prison terms, or even from death
sentences" (p. 412), as it provided a relatively mild way of dealing
with people who were hated and believed dangerous. Most important,
the Cabinet had been advised in May 1940 that Britain could fight
even if France fell, "so long as British morale held... ; a consequen-
tial recommendation was ruthless action against the Fifth Column"
(p. 185). This "special sort of political necessity - to exhibit a ruth-
less determination to continue the war against Germany at whatever
cost" (p. 412) - furnishes the strongest justification of Regulation
1 8B. As for those who
view executive detention as simply wrong in principle[, i]t is perhaps
worth remembering that any absolute objection to detention without
trial runs into problems unless it also excludes the pre-trial detention of
persons accused of crimes, and the detention of the mentally ill, or at
least explains why these practices may nevertheless be justifiable. [p.
413]
Simpson's ambivalence has the virtue of enabling the reader to
form his own judgment. Mine is that the British government was
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right to promulgate and enforce Regulation 18B and that the mistakes
and injustices and suffering that resulted were no more than were inev-
itable given the nature of the program and the human and institutional
resources available for its administration.
I have focused naturally on the areas in which I disagree with
Simpson, but I would not like that focus to convey a misleading im-
pression of my opinion of the book. My points of disagreement con-
cern matters of judgment and interpretation rather than of fact; what I
have called the book's ambivalence other readers will undoubtedly re-
gard as the proof of an admirably judicious balance. As a work of
modem legal and political history, In the Highest Degree Odious is a
superb achievement. To its wealth of illuminating detail, which some-
how does not slow the narrative, its breadth and scope, and the vivid-
ness and penetration of its account of British political and official life,
I cannot do justice in a review. But I hope I have succeeded in im-
parting something of the book's Hogarthian, even Swiftian, flavor. It
is that rare combination: a work of exhaustive scholarship, and a
splendid read.
